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IN THE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO N. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ESTHER MORRIS, 
Defendant, 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Plaivntiff, 
-vs-
GEORGE B. HANDY, 
Defendant. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
George B. Handy, defendant, appeals from a judg-
ment of the court rendered by Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Record on appeal consists of the pleadings, 
minute entries, pre-trial order, judgment and similar 
papers. 
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STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, George B. Handy, is an attorney at 
law, admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah and all state courts. 
In November, 1957, he was employed by one Cleo 
N. Smith, to institute action against one Esther Morris 
for injuries sustained by plaintiff Smith in an auto-
mobile accident with defendant Morris. Pre-trial hearing 
was had in the matter March 20, 1958 and the matter 
set for jury trial on April 29, 1958. 
On April 29th, 1958, which ·was the day set for trial, 
neither plaintiff Cleo Smith, nor her counsel, George B. 
Handy, appeared and Judge Stewart ~I. Hanson, on 
motion of defendant's counsel entered a judgment by 
default wherein plaintiff Smith's action against defen-
dant Morris was dismissed. 
At this point, George B. Handy, who had heretofore 
merely been counsel for plaintiff Smith, suddenly, with-
out service upon him of Summons or Complaint found 
himself designated as "Defendant" in an action desig-
nated "District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Plaintiff versus George B. Handy, defendant and 
judgment entered against him for the costs of impanelling 
sixteen jurors, in the sum of $128.00. 
The Court, in stating a reason for this action, seemed 
to be quite concerned about the lack of courtesy on the 
part of plaintiff S1nith and her counsel in not appearing 
for trial, nor in notifying the court of their intention 
not to appear. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL FOR COSTS OF IM-
PANELLING THE JURY. 
Prior to discussing what defendant Handy considers 
to be the sole issue raised by the judgment of the court, 
the appellant herein admits that neither plaintiff Smith 
nor her counsel informed the court that they did not 
intend to appear for trial and appellant herein assumes 
whatever censure there may be for this omission 
It should first be noted that defendant Handy was 
made a defendant and judgment entered aginst him 
without any compliance being made with Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which required the service of 
Summons and the filing of the complaint in accordance 
with the age old custom of giving a defendant the op-
portunity of having his day in court. The first and only 
notice Handy received of the courts action was the notice 
from the clerk that he had 10 days to pay up or have 
judgment entered against him. 
Rule 54 (d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the 
only statute or rule we have which pertains to the 
awarding or taxing of costs. This rule, insofar as it is 
material to this case is as follows: 
(d) COSTS 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express pro-
vision therefore is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs ; 
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There is no provision in the above rule, either ex-
pressly or by implication for costs of any nature to be 
imposed upon counsel for one of the parties, much less 
the costs of impanelling the jury. The only significance 
to be given to the above phrase "unless the court other-
wise directs" is that the court has discretion as to 
whether costs will be awarded to the prevailing party, 
to neither, and both parties to bear their own costs or 
to be apportioned between the parties in some other 
way. This seems to be born out by the practice of the 
courts and the authorities cited herein. 
Rule 54 (d) as cited above superseded sections 104-
44-1 to 18 inclusive and 104-44-21, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. There was no provision in the superseded statutes 
for the awarding of costs of any nature or the taxing 
of costs of any nature against the counsel of one of the 
parties. As found in the annotations for rule 54 (d), 
U.R.C.P. the Rules Committee in the preparation and 
drafting of these rules had this to say: 
"The above rule leaves the matter of costs 
somewhat to the discretion of the court and to 
that extent is inconsistent with our present statu-
tory provisions which set out the various situa-
tions where costs are awarded, ****It is intended, 
however, that the court will follow the former 
practice, insofar as applicable, in assessing costs." 
It is of great importance to note the type of costs 
taxed against defendant, costs of iinpanelling a jury. 
Even where it is proper to impose payment of costs, there 
is no precedent for ordering a proper party to pay such 
costs. 
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The Utah case of Fowler vs. Gillman 76 U. 414, 430; 
290 P. 358 held : 
"costs are mere incident to judgment to which 
they attach and are allowances to reimburse the 
successful party for expenses incurred in pre-
senting or defending an action or special proceed-
ing." 
If this is so, and we must assume that it is the law, 
or a correct interpretation of it, the taxing of the costs 
of impanelling a jury against plaintiff's counsel is with-
out a basis in law because such costs could not possibly 
be construed as "allowances to reimburse the successful 
party for expenses incurred". 
In the Utah case of Houghton vs. Barton, 49 U. 611; 
165 P. 471, it was held: 
"as costs were unknown at common law, the right, 
therefore to tax and recover costs in an action 
or proceeding is purely statutory and statutes 
authorizing them are strictly construed. 
See also Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 U. 9, 12; 12 P 
2 364. 
Therefore, according to Utah law, where the statute 
does not permit the assessing of cost of impanelling the 
jury as an item of costs and the statute does not allow 
the assessing of such costs against the counsel for one 
of the parties, the court was without authority to enter 
judgment against counsel as was done and the judgment 
rendered in the matter is void. 
The following are holdings under the Federal rule 
which is identical to the Utah rule. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Strong vs. Broward Country Kennel 
Club, 77 F. Supp. 262, a derivative action was brought 
by a stockholder by the name of McRitchie against the 
corporation. l\icRitchie was not a party to the action, 
because he was not a resident of Florida, the state in 
which the action was brought, but he was prosecuting 
the action in the names of two other stockholders who 
never appeared and testified. The action was dismissed 
and in taxing costs, the court held against the recommen-
dation of the special master in taxing costs and stated: 
"Although McRitchie was the sole stockholder 
actively prosecuting the ligitagion, because he was 
not a party to the litigation, the court was without 
authority to tax costs against him.'' 
The case of In Re Childs Co., 52 Fed. Supp., 89, 91 
in part concerned itself with the awarding and taxing 
of costs in a bankruptcy action and it concerned itself 
with the interpretation of Section 2 (18), 11 U.S.C.A. 
because of the request of one of the answering creditors 
to tax costs against one of the petitioning creditors. It 
held: 
"Section 2 ( 18) speaks of 'parties' and the gen-
eral rule is that no judgment for costs can be 
rendered against a person not a party to the 
suit." 20 C.J.S. Costs, Section 120, page 360. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 20, page 360, Section 120 
"The general rule is well settled that no judgment 
for costs can be rendered against a person not 
a party to the suit. There must be express statu-
tory provision to permit the awarding of costs 
against one not a party to the record." Citing 
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Tulare County vs. City of Dinuba, 220 P. 201 
(Cal) ; Lindsley vs. City & County of Denver, 196 
P. 859, (Colo.) 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, Section 29, page 1.9 
"As a general rule, costs are not recoverable by 
or taxable against a person who is not a party 
to the suit.'' 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, Section 32, page .:!1 
"Usually an attorney is not liable for costs of 
an action in connection with which he is em-
ployed." 
If the court in the instant case acted properly in 
taxing costs of impanelling the jury, against Counsel 
Handy, next it would appear that any attorney who 
brings action that seems non-meritorious to the court 
could be taxed with the costs of impanelling the jury and 
for such costs of retaining them, regardless of the number 
of days the jury sat. I admit that this does not seem to 
be a logical extension of the courts powers, and certainly 
not a power we would care to see the court exercise, 
but I consider it a logical extension of power if the action 
in the instant case is condoned. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing authorities and from the facts 
as stated I submit to the court that the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, erred in entering judgment against 
defendant Handy for costs of impanelling the jury in 
the matter of Smith vs Morris. 
7 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
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